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ABSTRACT  
This Article draws upon the thought of W.E.B. Du Bois and the late Professor Derrick Bell 
to analyze race-conscious university admissions today.  The Article has three main points.  First, it 
argues that there is a “double-consciousness” to race-consciousness.  In other words, there are two 
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ideas herein are the product of feedback from a variety of forums.  In addition to the 
Journal, I would like to thank participants in the 2013 Houston Higher Education Law 
Roundtable, the Fourth Annual John Mercer Langston Black Male Law Faculty Writing 
Workshop, the 2013 Chicago Junior Faculty Workshop, the Latina/o Critical Theory, Inc. 
(LatCrit) 2013 Conference, the Fourth Annual Loyola (Chicago) Constitutional Law 
Colloquium, and the faculty of Savannah Law School for their insightful commentary.  
Additionally, Professors Christopher Buccafusco, Richard Epstein, Wendy Netter Epstein, 
Michael Green, Stacy Hawkins, Helen Hershkoff, Darryl Levinson, Deborah Malamud, 
Mark Rosen, Christopher Schmidt, Carolyn Shapiro, along with Brian Burgess, also 
provided helpful feedback on earlier versions.  Also, Professors Paulette Caldwell, Devon 
Carbado, Robert Chang, Richard Delgado, Norman Dorsen, Sylvia Law, Michael Olivas, 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Cristina Rodríguez, and Margaret Beale Spencer have 
consistently supported my scholarly endeavors.  IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law 
provided financial and logistical support for my work from July 2012 to June 2014, while I 
was a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law; also, the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and 
Equality at Seattle University School of Law provided similar support from August 2010 to 
May 2012, while I was the Korematsu Teaching Fellow.  The W.E.B. Du Bois College 
House at the University of Pennsylvania initiated my interest in Du Bois’s writings, while I 
was a graduate resident advisor there from 1999 to 2003, and later an interim faculty 
fellow from 2005 to 2006.  Finally, the late Professor Derrick Bell and Ms. Janet Dewart 
Bell have supported my work in immeasurable ways, while I was the Derrick Bell Fellow at 
NYU School of Law from September 2009 to June 2010.  In Fall 2009, Professor Bell and I 
faced each other in an appellate oral argument, as a demonstration for the first class of 
his Current Constitutional Issues seminar.  The case we argued, chosen by Professor Bell, 
was Fisher v. University of Texas, which had been recently decided in the U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Texas.  I thus began formulating the ideas that resulted in two 
law review articles prior to the Supreme Court’s Fisher ruling, now this one after the 
ruling, and another one which is forthcoming.  It is thus particularly fitting that Professor 
Bell’s life and work are the inspiration for this Article. 
822 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:3 
 
different understandings of diversity, of race-neutrality, and of individualized review—the key 
tenets of Supreme Court doctrine on race-conscious admissions.  The double-consciousness of 
diversity, race-neutrality, and individualized review was prominent in the Fisher litigation and 
the legal discourse around Fisher more generally, leading to much confusion. 
 Second, in addition to double-consciousness, this Article argues that there is another source 
of confusion and contradiction in the Supreme Court’s doctrine on race-conscious admissions 
policies.  Together, the three prongs of diversity, race-neutrality, and individualized review form a 
“Bermuda Triangle” for university admissions.  Currently, admissions plans cannot have these 
three features together, but the Supreme Court requires universities to simultaneously strive for all 
three. 
 Finally, this Article revisits the idea of double-consciousness and contends that advocates of 
race-conscious admissions policies are, in the words of Professor Bell, “serving two masters”— 
freedom of universities to be diverse and elite, and social justice for poor people of color.  The 
Article contends that rather than a broad pronouncement by the Supreme Court, political process 
and lower court rulings will determine the fate of race-conscious admissions, at least in the near 
future.  The concluding section also discusses the Orwellian irony of “post-racial” America, where 
victory for racial justice is hard to distinguish from defeat. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION:  SERVING TWO MASTERS 
Slightly over a decade ago, when the Supreme Court upheld di-
versity as a compelling interest to justify race-conscious admissions 
policies in Grutter v. Bollinger,1 activists for racial justice—including 
me2—claimed to have won a huge victory.  However, one of our most 
cherished and respected role models had a very different reaction. 
In trademark iconoclastic fashion, the late Professor Derrick Bell 
wrote an essay entitled Diversity’s Distractions,3 where he called diversi-
ty a “serious distraction in the ongoing efforts to achieve racial jus-
tice . . . .”4  Professor Bell predicted that the Court’s approval of race-
 
 1 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding a holistic, individualized race-conscious admissions 
policy at the University of Michigan Law School after finding a compelling state interest 
in attaining the educational benefits of diversity).  Grutter affirmed the diversity rationale 
as a compelling interest and the use of race as a flexible “plus” factor—both of which the 
Supreme Court first articulated in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265 (1978).  On the same day Grutter was decided, the Supreme Court struck down the 
University of Michigan College of Letters, Arts, and Sciences’ race-conscious admissions 
plan, which automatically awarded twenty points on a 150 point scale to applicants from 
designated minority groups.  See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (holding that 
because the points system was not narrowly tailored to achieve the University’s 
compelling interest in diversity, the admissions policy violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
   With occasional exception for word variety, this Article uses the term “race-conscious 
admissions” rather than “affirmative action,” because the latter refers to a broader range 
of programs and policies than just university admissions, even though it is commonly 
used to refer specifically to race-conscious admissions policies.  Also, this Article uses the 
term “university” to refer to selective institutions of higher education generally, including 
colleges and professional schools that are not technically “universities.”  Unless otherwise 
indicated, the arguments herein apply broadly to selective institutions of higher 
education. 
 2 While at the University of Pennsylvania, I founded the CALL TO ACTION Project, a 
student initiative to defend race-conscious admissions policies, leading up to the Supreme 
Court oral arguments in Gratz and Grutter.  See Vinay Harpalani, Ambiguity, Ambivalence, 
and Awakening:  A South Asian Becoming “Critically” Aware of Race in America, 11 BERKELEY J. 
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 71, 80 (2009) [hereinafter Harpalani, Ambiguity] (noting that the 
CALL TO ACTION project was founded in response to the right wing assault on 
affirmative action and to promote racial justice through scholarship and activism).  See 
also Vinay Harpalani, Activism With the Pen, Not the Sword, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, Apr. 23, 
2003, at 6 [hereinafter Harpalani, Activism] (discussing how I formed the CALL TO 
ACTION project to mobilize the Penn community in defense of affirmative action). 
 3 Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (2003). 
 4 Id. at 1622 (arguing that “the concept of diversity, far from a viable means of ensuring 
affirmative action in the admissions policies of colleges and graduate schools, is a serious 
distraction in the ongoing efforts to achieve racial justice”).  See also, e.g., Charles R. 
Lawrence, III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 928, 931 (2001) (expressing “concern[] that liberal supporters of 
affirmative action have used the diversity argument to defend affirmative action at elite 
universities and law schools without questioning the ways that traditional admissions 
criteria continue to perpetuate race and class privilege”).  Professor Bell was one of my 
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conscious admissions policies, with diversity as the compelling inter-
est to constitutionally justify them, would merely invite further litiga-
tion; simultaneously, it would divert attention from race and class-
related inequalities and from universities’ reliance on admissions cri-
teria that benefit more privileged applicants, such as grades and test 
scores.5  He also forecasted that, in the long run, “this latest civil 
rights victory” would be “hard to distinguish from defeat.”6 
 
mentors, and this Article is inspired by his work.  For other, similar critiques of diversity, 
see Derrick Bell, What’s Diversity Got to Do With It? 6 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 527, 529 
(2008) (“We must even consider that racial diversity is a snare, and not an efficient means 
of achieving effective schooling for children who are poor or minority group members.”); 
Osamudia R. James, White Like Me:  The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale on White 
Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 425, 450 (2014) (noting that the diversity rationale 
has been criticized “for failing to advance racial justice, for primarily benefiting white 
institutions instead of students of color, for legitimizing admissions policies that favor the 
privileged, and for potentially pitting minority students against each other”); Eboni S. 
Nelson, Examining the Costs of Diversity, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 582 (2009) (arguing that 
the pursuit of diversity has come at a cost to the provision of equal opportunities to 
minority students).  See also Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2156 
(2013) (“The irony, then, is that our legal and social emphasis on diversity —while 
intended to produce progress toward a racially egalitarian society —has instead in many 
cases contributed to a state of affairs that . . . relegates nonwhite individuals to the status 
of ‘trophies’ or ‘passive emblems.’”) (citing Patrick S. Shin & Mitu Gulati, Showcasing 
Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1017, 1041 (2011)). 
 5 Bell, supra note 3, at 1622.  Professor Bell also referred to the race-conscious admissions 
policies approved in Grutter as “litigation-prompting compensation for admissions criteria 
that benefit the already privileged and greatly burden the already disadvantaged.”  Id. at 
1631.  Ironically, in spite of their vast ideological differences, Professor Derrick Bell and 
Justice Antonin Scalia did agree that Grutter would invite more litigation.  See Grutter, 539 
U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Unlike a clear 
constitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational institutions are 
impermissible, or even a clear anticonstitutional holding that racial preferences in state 
educational institutions are OK, today’s Grutter-Gratz split double header seems perversely 
designed to prolong the controversy and the litigation.”). 
   Grutter also provided an interesting point of confluence between Professor Derrick 
Bell and Justice Clarence Thomas.  Justice Thomas devoted one section of his Grutter 
dissent largely to critiquing the use of standardized tests in admissions—a view shared by 
Professor Bell. Compare id. at 367–71 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Law School’s 
continued adherence to measures [like the LSAT that] it knows produce racially skewed 
results is not entitled to deference by this Court.”), with Bell, supra note 3, at 1630 
(“Standardized tests . . . give an advantage to candidates from higher socioeconomic 
backgrounds and disproportionately screen out women, people of color, and those in 
lower income brackets.”).  Additionally, Justice Thomas was critical of universities’ 
elitism—another point of partial agreement with Professor Bell.  Compare Grutter at 355–
56 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he [University of Michigan] Law School seeks . . . [to 
enroll a racially diverse student body] . . . without sacrificing too much of its exclusivity 
and elite status.”), with Bell, supra note 3, at 1622 (“Diversity serves to give undeserved 
legitimacy to the heavy reliance on grades and test scores that privilege well-to-do, mainly 
white applicants.”).  Of course, Justice Thomas’s broader view of race-conscious policies is 
very different than that of Professor Bell. See id. at 1632 (Professor Bell noting that 
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Many years later, after working with Professor Bell and getting to 
know him well, his prediction reminds me of W.E.B. Du Bois’s classic 
metaphor of “double-consciousness”:  that “peculiar sensa-
tion . . . of . . . two-ness . . . two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled 
strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body . . . .”7  Professor Bell 
knew plenty about such “warring ideals”—captured eloquently in his 
classic article, Serving Two Masters.8  There, he analyzed the conflict 
between “integration ideals and client interests in school desegrega-
tion litigation”9 after Brown v. Board of Education.10  Professor Bell’s 
implicit use of the double-consciousness metaphor could just as easily 
apply to Grutter, where civil rights advocates felt similarly conflicted 
about serving two masters:  universities’ freedom to be diverse and 
elite,11 and the advocates’ own ideals of racial equality and justice, 
 
“Justice Thomas knows that [an elite university admissions] process is not based on merit, 
but his view of the Fourteenth Amendment is impotent to address the unfairness.”).  
 6 Bell, supra note 3, at 1622. 
 7 W. E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 3 (1903) (“It is a peculiar 
sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the 
eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused 
contempt and pity.  One ever feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two 
thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged 
strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.”). 
 8 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:  Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976) (describing tension between the goals 
of civil rights advocates and those of their clients).  Professor Bell derived the “serving two 
masters” metaphor from the New Testament.  See id. at 472 n.4 (quoting Luke 16:13 (King 
James) (“No servant can serve two masters:  for either he will hate the one, and love the 
other; or else he will hold to one, and despise the other.”).  For an interesting analysis of 
parallels between the work of Professor Bell and W.E.B. Du Bois, see James R. Hackney, 
Jr., Derrick Bell’s Re-Sounding:  W. E. B. Du Bois, Modernism, and Critical Race Scholarship, 23 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 141, 142 (1998) (analyzing how W. E. B. Du Bois’s ideas “are taken 
up, transformed, and re-sounded by later generations” of scholars, including Professor 
Derrick Bell). 
 9 Bell, Jr., supra note 8, at 470. 
 10 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racially segregated schools were unconstitutional); 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (ordering racial integration of 
segregated public schools “with all deliberate speed”).  W.E.B. Du Bois and Professor 
Derrick Bell expressed a similar ambivalence about racial integration of schools.  See 
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:  THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 102–22 
(1987) (arguing that “[n]either separate schools nor mixed schools” necessarily provide 
Black children with better education); Bell, Jr., supra note 8, at 516 (“[A] single minded 
commitment to racial balance . . . [is] all too often educationally impotent.”); W. E. 
Burghardt Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?,  4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328, 335 (1935) 
(arguing that quality of education is more important than whether schools are separate 
or integrated). 
 11 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (noting “a constitutional dimension, 
grounded in the First Amendment, of educational autonomy” for universities); Regents of 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (“The freedom of a university to make its 
own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.”); cf. Grutter, 
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which extended far beyond the elite.12  And with my ties to Professor 
Derrick Bell13 and to W.E.B. Du Bois,14  I see double-consciousness as 
a very fitting metaphor to understand race-conscious university ad-
missions today. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the constitutionality of race-
conscious admissions is confusing and convoluted, to say the least.  
The Court’s 2013 decision in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin illus-
trated this.15  After granting certiorari and deliberating for eight 
months after oral argument, the Court did very little that was new.16  
 
539 U.S. at 339 (“Narrow tailoring does not require . . .  a university to choose between 
maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide 
educational opportunities to members of all racial groups.”); id. at 340 (rejecting “the 
suggestion that the Law School simply lower admissions standards for all students, 
[because this is] a drastic remedy that would require the Law School to become a much 
different institution and sacrifice a vital component of its educational mission”); id. at 
355–56 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he [University of 
Michigan] Law School seeks to improve marginally the education it offers without 
sacrificing too much of its exclusivity and elite status.”). 
 12 See Vinay Harpalani, Diversity and Community Upliftment, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, Mar. 13, 
2013, http://www.thedp.com/article/2013/03/vinay-harpalani-diversity-and-community-
upliftment (noting that “elite, private universities like Penn . . . prefer[] minority students 
from privileged schools over those who are less privileged”); Vinay Harpalani, A Long 
Legacy of Activism at Penn, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, Apr. 9, 2003, http://www.thedp.com/
article/2003/04/vinay_harpalani_a_long_legacy_of_activism_at_penn (“[D]iversity was 
not the original motivation behind affirmative action.  Affirmative action programs in 
higher education began as radical desegregation measures; they were demanded by 
people of color who were fighting for equality . . . .  Unfortunately, while the current 
Penn administration embraces ‘diversity,’ it has forgotten how Penn became diverse in 
the first place.”). 
 13 I served as the Derrick Bell Fellow at New York University (NYU) School of Law in 2009–
10, sharing an office with Professor Bell for my first job out of law school and assisting 
him with teaching his classes.  See Vinay Harpalani, From Roach Powder to Radical 
Humanism:  Professor Derrick Bell’s “Critical” Constitutional Pedagogy, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
xxiii (2013) (describing Professor Derrick Bell’s teaching and life philosophies and his 
impact on students). 
 14 I served as a graduate resident advisor (1999–2003) and faculty fellow (2005–2006) in the 
W.E.B. Du Bois College House at the University of Pennsylvania and spent many hours 
analyzing and discussing Du Bois’s writings.  See Harpalani, Ambiguity, supra note 2, at 81 
(“Looking at myself through the eyes of Du Bois College House became part of my own 
‘double-consciousness[.]’”). 
 15 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 16 In Fisher, the Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s ruling that the University of Texas at Austin 
(“UT”) had a constitutionally permissible race-conscious admissions policy, but it did not 
deem UT’s policy to be unconstitutional.  Rather, it remanded the case for more 
stringent review, holding that the District Court for the Western District of Texas and 
Fifth Circuit had “confined the strict scrutiny inquiry in too narrow a way by deferring to 
the University’s good faith in its use of racial classifications[.]”  Id. at 2421.  Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg dissented.  Id. at 2432.  Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in the 
decision.  Id. at 2422. 
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Seven Justices signed on to Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opin-
ion, agreeing essentially to make no major alteration to the Court’s 
2003 framework from Grutter v. Bollinger—even though three of them, 
including Justice Kennedy, had dissented in Grutter.17  The only new 
tenet from Fisher was that courts must review compliance with Grutter 
more stringently.18  Race-conscious admissions policies are constitu-
tionally permissible in the manner prescribed by Grutter:  they must 
be necessary to fulfill the compelling interest in diversity,19 and they 
must involve individualized review of applicants.20  But courts must 
 
   My prior Article in the Journal of Constitutional Law partially foreshadowed the result 
in Fisher.  See Vinay Harpalani, Diversity Within Racial Groups and the Constitutionality of Race-
Conscious Admissions, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 463, 526 (2012) (“If the Supreme Court 
adopted . . . [the test that I propose] . . . it would vacate the Fifth Circuit ruling in Fisher, 
but it would not declare UT’s race-conscious policy to be unconstitutional.  Rather, it 
would remand the case for review based on the more stringent standard proposed 
here.”).  Compare Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421 (stating that UT has to “prove that its 
admissions program is narrowly tailored to obtain the educational benefits of diversity”), 
with Harpalani, supra, at 526 (stating that UT should have to prove that its race-conscious 
policy is “narrowly tailored to fit the compelling interest of attaining within-group 
diversity and its educational benefits”).  The Supreme Court called for the same standard 
as did my Article, although not for the same reasons; it did not address the issue of 
within-group diversity, which was the specific focus of my  prior Article. 
   Upon remand, the Fifth Circuit has once again affirmed the District Court’s ruling 
upholding UT’s race-conscious admissions policies.  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 
F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014).  A petition for rehearing en banc was denied on November 
12, 2014.  See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 771 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2014), available at 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Fisher-en-banc-denial-11-
12-14.pdf.  Nevertheless, the case could still be heard again by the U.S. Supreme Court.  
See Lyle Denniston, Fisher Case on Way Back to the Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 12, 2014, 
3:58 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/fisher-case-on-way-back-to-the-court. 
 17 See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (containing only one dissent—by Justice Ginsberg—and having 
been heard without Justice Kagan present); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346–49 
(2003) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting); id. at 349–78 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting); 
id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 18 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (“The reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no 
workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of 
diversity . . . ‘at tolerable administrative expense.’” (citation omitted)); see also Grutter, 539 
U.S. at 342 (“[R]ace-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. . . . In the 
context of higher education, the durational requirement can be met by sunset provisions 
in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine whether racial 
preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”). 
 19 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417 (recognizing that there is at least “one compelling interest that 
could justify the consideration of race:  the interest in the educational benefits that flow 
from a diverse student body”); id. at 2420 (“The reviewing court must ultimately be 
satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational 
benefits of diversity. . . ‘at tolerable administrative expense.’” (citation omitted)). 
 20 Id. at 2418 (“To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program . . . must 
remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual. . . .” 
(quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334, 337) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  See also 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336–37 (“When using race as a ‘plus’ factor in university admissions, a 
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now closely assess whether a university can use race-neutral policies 
instead and achieve the same diversity result.21  Read together, Grutter 
and Fisher create a perplexing nexus between diversity, individualized 
review, and race-neutrality.  The Court’s more recent decision in 
Schuette v. BAMN  does not shed any light on the issue, as Justice Ken-
nedy’s controlling opinion clearly stated that Schuette—which upheld 
Michigan’s state ban on race-conscious policies—was “not about the 
constitutionality, or the merits, of race-conscious admissions policies 
in higher education.”22 
This Article has three main points.  First, it argues that there is a 
“double-consciousness” to race-consciousness.  In other words, there 
are two different understandings of diversity, of race-neutrality, and 
of individualized review—the key tenets of Supreme Court doctrine 
on race-conscious admissions.23  The double-consciousness of diversi-
ty, race-neutrality, and individualized review was prominent in the 
Fisher litigation and the legal discourse around Fisher more generally.  
Litigants, commentators, and the courts have all proffered different 
views of these key tenets, leading to much confusion. 
 
university’s admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure that each 
applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or 
ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.  The importance of this 
individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is 
paramount.”); see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 n.52 (1978) 
(considering the “denial . . . of th[e] right to individualized consideration without regard 
to . . . race” to be the “principal evil” of the medical school’s admissions program). 
 21 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013) (calling for “a careful 
judicial inquiry into whether a university could achieve sufficient diversity without using 
racial classifications”).  See also id. (“The reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that 
no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of 
diversity . . . ‘at tolerable administrative expense.’”).  The Supreme Court’s ruling in Fisher 
was consistent with the “Kennedy template” for Grutter’s demise, articulated by Professor 
Ellen Katz prior to the decision.  See Ellen D. Katz, Grutter’s Denouement:  Three Templates 
From the Roberts Court, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1045, 1051, 1053 (2013) (explaining that Justice 
Kennedy’s prior opinions in Grutter and two other cases form a template that, if applied 
in Fisher, would require the Court to “examine with rigor the distinct ways administrators 
at the University of Texas (UT) use racial criteria to pursue their goal of racial diversity 
on campus” but “would nevertheless leave undisturbed Grutter’s recognition that the goal 
of diversity is a compelling objective that school administrators may lawfully pursue”). 
 22 Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights 
and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1630 (2014).  
Rather than evaluating the merits of race-conscious admissions policies, the Court in 
Schuette only considered “whether, and in what manner, voters in the States may choose to 
prohibit the consideration of racial preferences in governmental decisions, in particular 
with respect to school admissions.”  Id.  In other words, Schuette was “not about how the 
debate over racial preferences should be resolved.  It [wa]s about who may resolve it.”  Id. 
at 1638. 
 23 See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
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Second, in addition to double-consciousness, this Article argues 
that there is another source of confusion and contradiction in the 
Supreme Court’s doctrine on race-conscious admissions policies.  
The three prongs of diversity, race-neutrality, and individualized re-
view form a “Bermuda Triangle” for university admissions.  An admis-
sions plan cannot currently have these three features together, but 
the Supreme Court requires universities to simultaneously strive for 
all three.24 
Finally, this Article revisits the idea of double-consciousness and 
the notion of serving two masters.  It contends that, at least in the 
near future, state and local politics and lower court rulings will de-
termine the fate of race-conscious admissions policies, rather than a 
broad national pronouncement by the Supreme Court.  
This concluding section also examines Professor Bell’s prediction 
and discusses how advocates of race-conscious policies continue to 
grapple with their own double-consciousness, and more generally 
with the irony of “post-racial” America—where it is hard to distin-
guish between victory and defeat for racial justice. 
II.  THE DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS OF RACE-CONSCIOUSNESS 
The Supreme Court has always had its own internal conflict over 
race-conscious admissions policies, due to its growingly conservative 
composition since their advent.  Ever since their fractured 1978 rul-
ing in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke—where Justice Lew-
is Powell’s controlling opinion espoused diversity as a compelling in-
terest, struck down racial set-asides in higher education, but upheld 
the use of race as a “plus factor” in admissions25—the Justices have 
been very divided in their views of race-conscious admissions.  Over 
four separate dissents, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor authored a 5-4 
Grutter majority opinion that affirmed all the central tenets of Bakke 
and, in conjunction with Gratz v. Bollinger,26 established individualized 
 
 24 See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 25 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12 (finding that “the attainment of a diverse student 
body . . . clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher 
education”).  Justice Powell stated that while racial set-asides were unconstitutional, race 
could be used as an individual “plus” factor for applicants in order to achieve the 
compelling interest of attaining the educational benefits of diversity.  Id. at 317 (“[R]ace 
or ethnic background may be deemed a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file, yet it does 
not insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available 
seats.”). 
 26 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (striking down the University of Michigan’s race-conscious 
undergraduate admissions policy on the grounds that, because it involved a fixed point 
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review of applicants as a necessary condition of any race-conscious 
admissions policy.  Grutter also required universities to give “good 
faith consideration”27 to race-neutral alternatives, and to eventually 
phase out race-conscious admissions policies when feasible.28 
Unlike Bakke and Grutter, Fisher was not a fractured ruling in the 
usual sense.  Seven of the eight Justices who heard the case signed on 
to Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion.29  Nevertheless, Fisher’s reaf-
firmation of the diversity interest—without any further clarification of 
it—and its emphasis on stringent review of race-neutral alternatives 
both reinforce the Court’s divisions on this charged issue.  Diversity, 
race-neutrality, and individualized review all have their own double-
consciousness—due to the Supreme Court’s internal disagreements, 
and due to varying understandings of these tenets at large. 
A.  Diversity’s Double-Consciousness:  It’s More than the Numbers 
Diversity is of course fundamental to the constitutionality of race-
conscious admissions policies:  it is the compelling state interest that 
justifies them.30  But what exactly is this compelling interest and how 
do we determine if a race-conscious admissions policy is necessary to 
attain it?  These are difficult questions, in part because of diversity’s 
double-consciousness. 
On the one hand, the language of Grutter and Fisher highlights the 
educational benefits of diversity in higher education settings as the 
compelling interest.31  Professor Devon Carbado identifies eight ben-
efits of diversity that Justice O’Connor espoused in her Grutter majori-
ty opinion:  diversity serves to “promote speech and the robust ex-
change of ideas . . . effectuate the inclusion of underrepresented 
students . . . change the character of the school . . . disrupt and ne-
gate racial stereotypes . . . facilitate racial cooperation and under-
standing . . . create pathways to leadership . . . ensure democratic le-
 
system rather than flexible, individualized review of applicants, it was therefore not 
sufficiently narrowly tailored). 
 27 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003) (“Narrow tailoring does . . . require serious, 
good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the 
diversity the university seeks.”). 
 28 Id. at 342 (“[R]ace-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time . . . .  In the 
context of higher education, the durational requirement can be met by sunset provisions 
in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine whether racial 
preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”). 
 29 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2414 (2013). 
 30 See supra notes 1, 19 & 25. 
 31 See supra notes 1, 19 & 25. 
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gitimacy [and] . . . prevent racial isolation and alienation[.]”32  The 
Fisher opinion itself focused on “the educational benefits that flow 
from a diverse student body”33 as the “one compelling interest that 
could justify the consideration of race”34 in admissions.  Through its 
Grutter and Fisher majority opinions, the Supreme Court has framed 
the diversity interest in terms of educational activities and exchanges 
between diverse groups of students—intangibles that improve the 
quality of education for all involved. 
On the other hand, however, because the educational benefits of 
diversity are difficult to measure and review, litigants in Fisher framed 
diversity in terms of numerical representation:  numbers and per-
centages of various groups of minority students.  Because the Su-
preme Court in Bakke prohibited the use of numerical goals or quotas 
for race-conscious admissions,35 the Fisher litigation focused on the 
presence of a “critical mass” of underrepresented students—a con-
cept that attempts to combine numerical representation with the ed-
ucational benefits of diversity.36  And as we saw in Fisher, “critical 
mass” turns out to be a rather vague concept.37 
 
 32 Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1130, 1145–46 (2013). 
 33 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (noting that the school’s 
admissions program neglected to consider enough “qualifications and characteristics” of 
applicants and therefore could not attain “diversity that furthers a compelling state 
interest”). 
 36 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319 (2003) (“[C]ritical mass means numbers such 
that underrepresented minority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for 
their race.”);  see also I. Bennett Capers, Flags, 48 HOW. L.J. 121, 122–23 (2004) 
(“[C]ritical mass is not solely numerical. Rather, a critical mass implies a climate where 
one is neither conspicuous nor on display, where one does not feel the opprobrium of 
being a token, nor the burden of being the designated representative for an entire group. 
It also implies a climate where one can speak freely, where one not only has a voice, but a 
voice that will be heard.”).  For more discussion of different definitions of “critical mass” 
in the context of race-conscious admissions policies, see Harpalani, supra note 16, at 471–
85; Vinay Harpalani, Fisher’s Fishing Expedition, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. HEIGHT. SCRUTINY 
57, 58–66 (2013) [hereinafter Harpalani, Fishing Expedition]. 
 37 See generally Harpalani, Fishing Expedition, supra note 36 (discussing the various ways of 
defining “critical mass”).  But see William C. Kidder, Misshaping the River:  Proposition 209 
and Lessons for the Fisher Case, 39 J.C. & U.L. 53, 63 (2013) (“The benefits associated with 
‘critical mass’ are highly context-dependent and not amenable to a one-size-fits-all 
admissions target, but these benefits are no less real and measurable because they are 
manifest in the complex ecosystem of higher learning.”).  Chancellor Kidder’s assertion 
about critical mass here also distinguishes between two different uses of the concept:  (1) 
universities’ campus-specific determinations of diversity’s benefits and minority students’ 
needs, which this Article endorses; and (2) courts’ use of critical mass as a generalizable 
standard to review the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies, which this 
Article critiques.  See also William C. Kidder, The Salience of Racial Isolation:  African 
Americans’ and Latinos’ Perceptions of Climate and Enrollment Choices with and without 
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The plaintiffs in Fisher based their claim on “critical mass”:  they 
argued that the 21.4% minority (Black and Latina/o combined) en-
rollment at the University of Texas at Austin (“UT”), attained in 2004 
with the race-neutral Top Ten Percent Law38 alone, was a “critical 
mass” and fulfilled the constitutionally permissible compelling inter-
est in diversity.  Consequently, they contended that UT was not justi-
fied in using a race-conscious admissions policy in addition to the 
Top Ten Percent Law. 
UT’s response to the plaintiff’s argument also focused on numeri-
cal representation.  It pointed to low percentages of Black and Lati-
na/o students in many small classes to show that it had not attained a 
“critical mass.”39  Although UT did allude to the linkage between 
“critical mass” and the educational benefits of diversity, its emphasis 
was also on numbers sufficient (or insufficient) to constitute a “criti-
cal mass.”40 
But neither the Fisher plaintiffs nor UT could provide a measura-
ble definition of “critical mass.”  Ironically, both parties agreed that 
“critical mass” implied numbers such that minority students “do not 
feel isolated and like spokespersons for their race,”41 but neither 
 
Proposition 209, at 13, UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT (Oct. 9, 2012), available at http://
civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/college-access/affirmative-action/the-salience-of-
racial-isolation-african-americans2019-and-latinos2019-perceptions-of-climate-and-
enrollment-choices-with-and-without-proposition-209/.  (“The data lend support to the 
concept of ‘critical mass’ while acknowledging that context matters and it is unrealistic to 
expect an across-the-board numerical definition of what constitutes sufficient critical 
mass.”). 
 38 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.803 (West 1997).  The Top Ten Percent Law guarantees 
admission to UT to the top students (originally top 10 percent of each graduating class) 
in all Texas public high schools.  The law was passed by the Texas legislature in response 
to Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that UT Law could not use race 
as an admissions factor), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding 
that universities could use race as a plus factor in admissions).  In 2011, the Top Ten 
Percent Law was amended to limit guaranteed admission at UT to 75% of the seats 
designated for Texas residents.  See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.803(a-1) (West 2010).  
This limit begins with admissions to the entering class of Fall 2011 and continues until 
the entering class of Fall 2015.  See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 224 
n.56 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
   The Fisher litigation and ruling assumed that the Top Ten Percent Law is “race-
neutral.”  But see infra note 68. 
 39 See Harpalani, supra note 16, at 504–06, and sources cited therein. 
 40 See Harpalani, supra note 16. 
 41 Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 
(2013) (No. 11-345) (noting by plaintiff’s counsel that the question to consider when 
determining if a critical mass exists is whether underrepresented minority students are 
“isolated . . . [and] unable to speak out[.]”); id. at 47 (noting by UT’s counsel that to 
determine if critical mass is present, “we look to feedback directly from students about 
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could say how to determine when this occurs.  The plaintiffs con-
tended it was UT’s burden to define and measure critical mass.42  UT 
offered that surveys of student isolation, along with other campus da-
ta including numerical representation of various groups, could help 
determine whether a critical mass was present,43 but it did not provide 
any guidance on how to do this—much less on how to determine 
whether race-conscious policies are necessary to achieve the “critical 
mass.”  This led Justice Antonin Scalia to say, derisively, “[w]e should 
stop calling it ‘critical mass’ . . . call it a cloud or something like 
that.”44 
The only reliably measurable diversity-related outcome in the Fish-
er litigation was the numerical representation of minority students it-
self—on campus and in various classes.  And focus on numerical rep-
resentation poses its own conundrum:  Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher 
clearly stated that numerical goals for race-conscious admissions poli-
cies are unconstitutional.45  Justice Sonia Sotomayor recognized this 
at the Fisher oral argument, when she said to plaintiffs’ counsel:  “Boy, 
it sounds awfully like a quota to me that you shouldn’t be setting 
goals, that you shouldn’t be setting quotas . . . .”46 
In spite of the focus on numerical representation by litigants in 
Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher, the controlling opinions in all of these cases 
indicate that the goal of a race-conscious admissions policy is more 
nuanced than attaining any numerical index of diversity: 
 
racial isolation that they experience” and ask, “[d]o they feel like spokespersons for their 
race[?]”). 
 42 Id. at 16–17 (noting by plaintiff’s counsel that it is “not [the Plaintiff’s] burden to 
establish the number” that constitutes critical mass). 
 43 Id. at 47–49 (noting by UT’s counsel that critical mass is determined via “feedback [via 
surveys] directly from students about racial isolation that they experience,” “enrollment 
data, . . . [d]iversity in the classroom[,] . . . [and] the racial climate on campus”). 
 44 Id. at 71–72.  The courtroom erupted in laughter after Justice Scalia made this statement. 
 45 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329–30 (2003) (noting that “[t]he Law School’s 
interest is not simply ‘to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a 
particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin’ . . . [t]hat would amount to 
outright racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional” (citing Regents of Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978))); Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418 (“To be narrowly 
tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system[.]”) (quoting 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 656 (5th Cir. 
2014) (“[A]n examination that looks exclusively at the percentage of minority students 
fails before it begins.”). 
 46 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 41, at 19.  But see Sheldon Lyke, Catch Twenty-
Wu?  The Oral Argument in Fisher v. University of Texas and the Obfuscation of Critical Mass, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 209, 216 (2013), available at http://www.law.northwestern.
edu/lawreview/colloquy/2013/19/LRColl2013n19Lyke.pdf (arguing that “critical mass 
has both quantitative and qualitative elements” and that  “contrary to Justice Sotomayor’s 
claim[,] . . . goals and quotas are [not] synonymous”). 
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It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified per-
centage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of se-
lected ethnic groups, with the remaining percentage an undifferentiated 
aggregation of students.  The diversity that furthers a compelling state in-
terest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteris-
tics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important ele-
ment.47 
Diversity is thus caught between “two unreconciled strivings”48:  the 
educational benefits of nuanced, individualized race-conscious ad-
missions—emphasized in the language of all major Supreme Court 
cases—and the numerical representation of minority groups, which 
provides the main data used to make arguments for and against race-
conscious admissions policies.49  Fisher did not resolve this double-
consciousness, and lower courts will have to grapple with the issue 
and decide how to assess diversity. 
B.  Individualized Review’s Double-Consciousness:  Is It Just the Numbers? 
Individualized review of applicants is a requirement for any consti-
tutionally-permissible race-conscious admissions policy under Grutter 
and Fisher50—a requirement that, in a sense, also has a double-
consciousness of its own.  The Grutter and Fisher majority opinions de-
scribed holistic admissions policies that consider race in a flexible, 
nuanced, and individualized manner, in conjunction with other ad-
missions factors, and the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Fisher on remand 
emphasized that individuals of any race could benefit in the admis-
sions process.51  Individualized review in this vein is discretionary, sub-
 
 47 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411,  2418 (2013) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 
315). 
 48 DU BOIS, supra note 7 (“One ever feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, 
two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose 
dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.”). 
 49 Justice Clarence Thomas critiques this double-consciousness of diversity in his Grutter 
dissent.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 355 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“ A distinction between these 
two ideas (unique educational benefits based on racial aesthetics and race for its own 
sake) is purely sophistic-so much so that the majority uses them interchangeably.”). 
 50 See supra note 20. 
 51 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 2014) (“No numerical  value 
is ever assigned to . . . race . . . [which] is a factor considered in the unique context of 
each applicant’s  entire experience . . . [and] . . . may be a beneficial factor for a minority 
or a non-minority student.”); id. at 659 (“Race is relevant to minority and non-minority, 
notably when candidates have flourished as a minority in their school—whether they are 
white or black.”); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex at Austin., 631 F.3d 213, 236 (5th Cir. 
2011), vacated, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (noting that in 
framework of UT’s race-conscious admissions policy, “race can enhance the personal 
achievement score of a student from any racial background, including whites and Asian-
Americans”). 
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jective, and, above all, flexible.  However, critics of race-conscious 
admissions contend that this is a smokescreen— that elite universities 
merely institute a thin veneer of individualized review and holistic 
admissions to cover much larger systematic “race preferences” for 
particular groups, usually African Americans, Latina/os, and Native 
Americans.  To these critics, the university admissions game is still 
numbers-centered and only three factors really matter:  GPA, stand-
ardized test scores, and race.52  Thus, there is a discord between how 
Supreme Court doctrine describes individualized review and how 
some perceive that elite university admissions use it in practice.53 
 
 52 See, e.g., RICHARD H. SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, MISMATCH:  HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT 18–19 
(2012) (“At most large schools . . . descriptions [such as ‘holistic’] are completely 
fanciful; admissions are driven by fairly mechanical decision rules. . . .[E]ven at schools 
that truly do make decisions on a case-by-case basis . . . implicit weight given to . . . [an] 
applicant’s race . . . is generally very large indeed.”). But see Rachel Rubin, Who Gets In and 
Why? An Examination of Admissions to America’s Most Selective Colleges and Universi-
ties, 2 INT’L EDUC. RES. 1 (2014), http://www.todayscience.org/IER/article/ier.v2i2p01.p
df (analyzing and describing variations and nuances of holistic admissions plans at differ-
ent types of universities). 
 53 There is a school of thought suggesting that it is better not to know the particulars of 
race-conscious policies, to avoid stigmatization.  See Paul Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence:  
Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. 
REV. 907, 928 (1983) (“The indirectness of the less explicitly numerical systems may have 
significant advantages, not so much in terms of the processes of consideration as in the 
felt impact of their operation over time.  The description of race as simply ‘another 
factor’ among a lot of others considered in seeking diversity tends to minimize the sense 
that minority students are separate and different and the recipients of special 
dispensations; the use of more explicitly separate and structured systems might have the 
opposite effect.”); see also Heather Gerkin, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal 
Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104, 104 (2007) (characterizing Justices Powell and 
O’Connor’s views as “something akin to a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ approach to race-
conscious decisionmaking:  use race, but don’t be obvious about it” (internal citation 
omitted)); Daniel Sabbagh, Judicial Uses of Subterfuge:  Affirmative Action Reconsidered, 118 
POL. SCI. Q. 411, 412 (2003) (“[T]he very nature of what may be conceived as the 
ultimate goal of affirmative action—namely, the deracialization of American society, 
insofar as racial identification remains inextricably bound up with a constellation of 
inegalitarian assumptions—would make it counterproductive to fully disclose that policy’s 
most distinctive and most contentious features—its nonmeritocratic component and the 
extent to which some of these programs take race into account. . . .[I]n several Supreme 
Court decisions . . . judges have made a significant, yet underappreciated, contribution to 
that rational process of minimizing the visibility and distinctiveness of race-based 
affirmative action.”).  But see Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
1899, 1902 (2006) (critiquing Grutter because “[i]t is hardly clear that the Constitution 
should be taken to require a procedure that sacrifices transparency, predictability, and 
equal treatment . . .”); David Crump, The Narrow Tailoring Issue in the Affirmative Action 
Cases:  Reconsidering the Supreme Court’s Approval in Gratz and Grutter of Race-Based Decision-
Making by Individualized Discretion, 56 FLA. L. REV. 483, 528 (2004) (“One can argue that 
the undergraduate Michigan program at issue in Gratz, involving a fixed-point system, 
should have been regarded as constitutionally superior to the unlimited discretion model 
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Beyond this double-consciousness, individualized review affects 
our understanding of both diversity and race-neutrality.  It is through 
individualized review that a university admissions committee can use 
race in a flexible, nuanced manner, in conjunction with other admis-
sions factors,54 and thus fulfill the compelling interest in diversity ar-
ticulated in Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher.55  Both Grutter and Fisher specifi-
cally noted that the breakdown of racial stereotypes is one of the 
educational benefits of diversity,56 and that universities can use indi-
vidualized review to identify applicants to help accomplish this end.57  
At the Fisher oral argument, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli—
arguing in favor of UT’s race-conscious admissions policy—
contended that one purpose of such a policy is to identify individuals 
who defy racial stereotypes, such as “the African American fencer.”58  
If identifying and admitting individuals who break down racial stereo-
types is part of the compelling interest in diversity, this creates a co-
nundrum for race-neutrality:  there is no race-neutral policy that can 
identify and admit African American fencers.  By definition, one must 
consider race in order to do so. 
But even if such nuanced use of race is not necessary to fulfill the 
diversity interest, individualized review has broader consequences for 
 
in Grutter . . . . At least in such a system the invidious exercise of discretion has been 
structured, confined, and checked . . . . The point system used in the undergraduate 
program struck down in Gratz should instead have been preferred because it makes the 
racial remedy visible . . . .”). 
 54 See supra note 20. 
 55 See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text. 
 56 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (“[T]he educational benefits that diversity 
is designed to produce . . . are substantial . . . [and include] break[ing] down racial 
stereotypes[.]”); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013) (noting 
that educational benefits of diversity include “lessening of racial isolation and 
stereotypes”). 
 57 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 236 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 
2411 (2013) (noting that in the framework of UT’s race-conscious admissions policy, “a 
white student who has demonstrated substantial community involvement at a 
predominantly Hispanic high school may contribute a unique perspective that produces a 
greater personal achievement score than a similarly situated Hispanic student from the 
same school . . . [and] just as in Grutter, UT applicants of every race may submit 
supplemental information to highlight their potential diversity contributions, which 
allows students who are diverse in unconventional ways to describe their unique 
attributes”). 
 58 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 41, at 61 ( “[U]niversities . . . are looking . . . to 
make individualized decisions about applicants who will directly further the educational 
mission.  For example, they will look for individuals who will play against racial 
stereotypes . . . [t]he African American fencer; the Hispanic who has . . . mastered 
classical Greek.”). 
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our understanding of race-neutrality—as the next section on the 
double-consciousness of race-neutrality will show. 
C.  Race-Neutrality’s Double-Consciousness:  It Is the Numbers! 
Unlike diversity and individualized review, race-neutrality is not 
(and cannot be!) part of the constitutional requirement for race-
conscious admissions.  It is actually the opposite:  the absence of via-
ble race-neutral policies that can attain the compelling interest in di-
versity is a constitutional requirement for any university using race-
conscious admissions.59  But like diversity and individualized review, 
race-neutrality also suffers from its own double-consciousness—and 
perhaps even more so.  It can have at least two different meanings, 
and the Supreme Court has not even acknowledged these disparate 
understandings of race-neutrality, much less addressed them in any 
meaningful way. 
One definition of race-neutrality is “colorblindness”:  information 
about an applicant’s race is completely absent in the admissions pro-
cess—or, at least, it cannot be considered by admissions reviewers.  In 
Fisher, the Supreme Court and the litigants held to this view.60  But 
race-neutrality in this formal sense can occur only in an admissions 
process that is mechanistic—that is, without individualized review or 
discretion by admissions officers.  In such a process, admissions deci-
sions occur automatically, based on academic criteria such as GPAs, 
class rank, and/or standardized test scores.  Texas’s Top Ten Percent 
Plan is one example of such an admissions plan, which is why Fisher 
held to this definition. 
This type of formal race-neutrality is difficult to achieve in a holis-
tic admissions process, where race is not as simple as a box that appli-
cants can check.  Individualized review inherently provides admis-
sions officers with discretion, along with plenty of other information 
about each applicant.  Applicants’ personal statements and essays, ex-
tracurricular activities,61 and even their names62 may reveal clues as to 
 
 59 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (“The reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no 
workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of 
diversity . . . ‘at tolerable administrative expense . . . .’”). 
 60 See Harpalani, Fishing Expedition, supra note 36, at 69–71 (discussing how race was a small 
factor in the UT admissions process). 
 61 See How Berkeley Selects Students, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY OFFICE OF 
UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSIONS, http://admissions.berkeley.edu/selectsstudents (last 
visited Dec. 31, 2014) (providing a description of selection criteria for admission, 
including a “holistic review of all information—both academic and personal”); The 
Personal Statement, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY OFFICE OF UNDERGRADUATE 
ADMISSIONS,  http://admissions.berkeley.edu/personalstatement  (last visited Dec. 31, 
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their racial/ethnic background.  Admissions officers’ unconscious bi-
ases may come into play during their individualized review of applica-
tions, and conscious biases can also come into play:  those reviewers 
who desire to increase the number of admitted minority students al-
ready have access to the information to do so.  Even in states with 
constitutional bans on race-conscious admissions, there have been 
accusations that admissions officers consider race subversively, as in-
dividualized review and holistic admissions plans allow them to do 
so.63  Moreover, there is no practical way to fully eliminate this phe-
nomenon.64 
 
2014) (calling the personal statement “a vital part of [an applicant’s] application”).  The 
first prompt to which applicants must respond is,  “Describe the world you come from—
for example, your family, community or school—and tell us how your world has shaped 
your dreams and aspirations.”  See The Personal Statement, supra.  In response to this 
prompt, applicants can readily allude to their racial background and members of 
underrepresented minority groups can self-identify. 
 62 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 304 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that 
without affirmative action, “[s]eeking to improve their chances for admission, applicants 
may highlight . . . the Hispanic surnames of their mothers or grandparents”). See generally 
Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, The Causes and Consequences of Distinctively Black 
Names, 119 Q. J. OF ECON. 767 (2004) (discussing the shift from similarities  between black 
and white names in the 1960s to distinctly African American names in the 1970s).   
 63 See Harpalani, Fishing Expedition, supra note 36, at 70–72.  See also SANDER & TAYLOR, supra 
note 52, at 169–70 (contending that, as of 2012, “the University of California system is 
still, formally race-neutral, but in practice it has come very close to a form of racial 
proportionality . . . [and that] . . . neither voters nor state officials can end university 
racial preferences by a single stroke”); id. at 158 (contending that after Proposition 209 
(California’s constitutional ban on race-conscious policies) was passed in 1996, faculty in 
the University of California system “spoke of the feasibility of evasion” for “small 
programs,” where “[t]he number of students was so small, and the criteria for selection so 
subjective, that outside investigators could not easily detect racial discrimination”).  
Professors Sander and Taylor also note that “[f]or larger programs, such as law schools or 
business schools, that [subversive use of race] would obviously be more difficult.”  Id.  But 
see TIM GROSECLOSE, REPORT ON SUSPECTED MALFEASANCE IN UCLA ADMISSIONS AND THE 
ACCOMPANYING COVER-UP (2008), available at  http://images.ocregister.com/
newsimages/news/2008/08/CUARSGrosecloseResignationReport.pdf; CHEATING: AN 
INSIDER’S REPORT ON THE USE OF RACE IN ADMISSIONS AT UCLA (2014).  
   One article on the UCLA controversy questioned whether “holistic” admissions 
policies simply help Black applicants.  Scott Jaschik, Is “Holistic” Admissions a Cover for 
Helping Black Applicants?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 2, 2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.
insidehighered.com/news/2008/09/02/ucla. 
 64 See Jaschik, supra note 63 (describing UCLA’s insistence on the sufficiency and legality of 
its admissions process); see also Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial 
Preferences, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1139, 1146 (2008) (exploring unconscious racial biases in 
admissions and raising “the question of whether race can in fact be eliminated from 
admissions processes”); Daniel N. Lipson, Embracing Diversity:  The Institutionalization of 
Affirmative Action as Diversity Management At UC-Berkeley, UT-Austin, and UW-Madison, 32 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 985, 1015 (2007) (noting that “the line between race-based and race-
blind policy making can be quite blurry”). 
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Most elite universities—and particularly private universities—use 
holistic admissions plans with individualized review.  Grutter and Fisher 
endorsed this type of admissions plan and went as far as to require it 
if race is to be an admissions factor.65  As such, if race-neutrality is un-
derstood in formal terms, Grutter’s and Fisher’s narrow tailoring prin-
ciples are self-contradictory:  their requirement for holistic, individu-
alized review undercuts their espoused goal of race-neutrality. 
A second definition of race-neutrality, which is more compatible 
with holistic admissions plans, is rooted in statistical disparities rather 
than in formal absence of race.  Here, we can define race-neutrality 
as the lack of any significant statistical disparities between minority 
and non-minority admittees on academic criteria such as grades, class 
rank, and standardized test scores.  Under this view, it does not mat-
ter that admissions reviewers can access and even consider infor-
mation about an applicant’s race, so long as doing so does not lead to 
significant statistical disparities in admitted applicants’ academic cri-
teria by race. 
Such statistical disparities are the major concern of critics of race-
conscious admissions policies.  Plaintiffs in Bakke and Grutter (but not 
in Fisher) relied heavily on such statistical disparities to make constitu-
tional arguments against race-conscious admissions policies.66  Also, 
proponents of “mismatch theory” focus on those disparities to con-
tend that race-conscious policies can harm minority students.67  In 
this vein, it makes sense to effectively deem an admissions process as 
race-neutral if there are no academic disparities between admitted 
 
 65 See supra note 20. 
 66 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277–78 n.7 (comparing Plaintiff Alan 
Bakke’s GPA and MCAT scores “with the average scores of regular admittees and of 
special admittees in both 1973 and 1974”); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 
821, 838 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev’d, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) 
(discussing how the plaintiffs’ expert witness concluded that “all the graphs comparing 
Native American, African American, Mexican American, and Puerto Rican applicants to 
Caucasian American applicants show wide separation indicating a much higher 
probability of acceptance for the particular ethnic group at a given selection index value” 
(quotation marks omitted)).  But see Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy:  Bakke and the 
Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1049 (2002), cited in Gratz, 
539 U.S. at 303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In any admissions process where applicants 
greatly outnumber admittees, and where white applicants greatly outnumber minority 
applicants, substantial preferences for minority applicants will not significantly diminish 
the odds of admission facing white applicants.”). 
 67 In its critiques of race-conscious admissions, “mismatch theory” also focuses on statistical 
academic disparities between admitted students of different racial groups.  See generally 
SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 52.  For a critique of mismatch theory, see generally Stacy 
L. Hawkins, Mismatched Or Counted Out?  How Mismatch Theory Is Incomplete, What’s Missing, 
and Why It Matters, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 855 (2015). 
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minority and non-minority applicants, regardless of whether the pro-
cess itself takes race into account.  While they are not enough to de-
fine diversity, the numbers really should be at the core of race-
neutrality. 
We should also note that under this second definition, Texas’s 
Top Ten Percent Plan is not race-neutral:  there are disparities in 
standardized test scores between minority and non-minority students 
admitted under the Top Ten Percent Plan.68 
 
 68 For the UT entering class of 2009, among students automatically admitted via the Top 
Ten Percent Law, White students (a total of 2,508 students) had a mean SAT score of 
1864; African American students (a total of 297) had a mean SAT score of 1584; Asian 
American students (a total of 1101) had a mean SAT score of 1874; and Hispanic 
students (a total of 1256) had a mean SAT score of 1628.  UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN 
OFFICE OF ADMISSIONS, IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS OF TEX. AUT. ADMISSIONS LAW (HB 
588) AT UNIV. OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN:  SAT MEAN AND FRESHMAN GPA BY UNDERGRADUATE 
COLLEGES AND ETHNICITY ENTERING 2009, at 14 tbl. 7. 
   Others have contended that the Top Ten Percent Plan is not even formally race-
neutral.  See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303–04 n.10 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“Calling such 10% or 20% plans ‘race-neutral’ seems to me disingenuous, for 
they ‘unquestionably were adopted with the specific purpose of increasing representation 
of African-Americans and Hispanics in the public higher education system.’”); see also id. 
at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“‘[P]ercentage plans’ are just as race conscious as the 
point scheme (and fairly so), but they get their racially diverse results without saying 
directly what they are doing or why they are doing it.”); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 
2411, 2433 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[O]nly an ostrich could regard the 
supposedly neutral alternatives [in Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law] as race 
unconscious. . . .[T]he vaunted alternatives suffer from ‘the disadvantage of deliberate 
obfuscation.’” (quotations omitted)); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 242 
n.156 (5th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (“A court considering the 
constitutionality of the [Top Ten Percent] Law would examine whether Texas enacted 
the Law (and corresponding admissions policies) because of its effects on identifiable 
racial groups or in spite of those effects.”); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 
(1979) (holding that granting an absolute lifetime preference does not unfairly 
discriminate against women); cf. Brief for Social Scientists Glenn C. Loury et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 
402129, at *3, *9–10 (noting that “it is not clear that these [percentage] plans are actually 
race-neutral” and that some amici counsel in Grutter “signaled interest in moving on after 
this case to challenge these aspects of the Texas program”).  But see Leslie Yalof Garfield, 
The Paradox Of Race-Conscious Labels, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1523, 1567 (2014) (“By 
categorizing the Texas [Top Ten Percent] Law as race-neutral, the Court turns a blind 
eye to the segregation that serves as the foundation for assembling diverse student bodies 
in the State’s post-secondary schools. . . .On the other hand . . . [l]abeling the Top Ten 
Percent Law as race-conscious demands that courts subject it to rigorous strict scrutiny[,]. 
. . making it a likely candidate for constitutional demise.”); Eboni S. Nelson, What Price 
Grutter?  We May Have Won the Battle, but Are We Losing the War?  32 J.C. & U.L. 1, 8 (2005) 
(arguing that “in order to be considered race-neutral . . . [i]t is only necessary that 
[programs] do not allow applicants to be classified and/or selected based on their race or 
ethnicity”).  See also Reva Siegel, Race-Conscious but Race-Neutral: The Constitutionality of 
Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA. L. REV. 653, 675 (2015) (noting that the Top 
Ten Percent Plan “pursue[s] a race-conscious goal of promoting equal opportunity” but 
“does not classify individuals by race” and thus does not “trigger[] strict scrutiny.”).  
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One can also combine the two definitions of race-neutrality posit-
ed here:  an “either-or” definition is plausible.  Under this view, we 
can deem an admissions policy as “race-neutral” if:  (1) it is mechanis-
tic rather than discretionary and does not formally access information 
about an applicant’s race; or (2) regardless of whether the admissions 
process accesses information about an applicant’s race, there are no 
statistical disparities in academic criteria between admitted applicants 
of different racial groups. 
The Supreme Court, however, has stuck to a formal definition of 
race-neutrality—one that is focused on the absence of race from the 
admissions process.  The Court has acted as if diversity and its educa-
tional benefits, holistic, individualized review of applicants, and for-
mal race-neutrality are all compatible.  But as the next Part shows, 
they are not; they form a “Bermuda Triangle” for university admis-
sions. 
III.  THE BERMUDA TRIANGLE OF UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 
By itself, the double-consciousness of diversity, race-neutrality, and 
individualized review—the varying understandings of these terms in 
Supreme Court litigation and opinions—creates enough confusion 
about the future of race-conscious admissions policies.  But even be-
yond this confusion, these three core tenets of the Supreme Court’s 
doctrine on race-conscious admissions are incompatible.  They can-
not all be attained at the same time—they form a “Bermuda Trian-
gle” for university admissions. 
A.  Fisher and the Bermuda Triangle:  Still a Fishing Expedition 
From one perspective, Fisher v. University of Texas illustrated well 
the Bermuda Triangle of university admissions.  The Fisher litigation 
framed diversity largely in terms of numerical representation of mi-
nority groups, even if the language of the litigants’ briefs alluded to 
educational benefits and the like.  With changes in racial de-
mographics—increasing numbers of Black and Latino/a residents in 
Texas—the Top Ten Percent Plan might yield numerical representa-
tion of minority students equivalent to most holistic admissions 
plans—if not now, then in the near future.  Also, the Top Ten Per-
 
Professor Siegel argues that in Fisher, the U.S. Supreme Court could not possibly have 
“overlooked the race- conscious aims of the [Top Ten] percent program[,]” but “[n]o 
Justice raised questions about the [plan’s] constitutionality[.]”  Id. at 673–74.  Of course, 
the Fisher litigation did not raise a constitutional challenge to the Top Ten Percent Plan. 
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cent Plan is formally race-neutral69:  race does not play any direct role 
in admission of students.  So two of the three tenets could be ful-
filled. 
But the Top Ten Percent Plan is not a holistic admissions policy 
and does not include individualized review of applicants.  Students 
admitted to UT under the Top Ten Percent Plan did not have any-
one exercise discretionary review over their applications:  they were 
admitted via an automatic formula that considered only their class 
ranks.70  Fisher was an unusual case:  the only reason it came in to be-
ing was that the Texas state legislature voluntarily adopted the Top 
Ten Percent Law, and then-Governor George W. Bush signed it into 
law.  This has not happened in most states and could not practically 
apply to private universities or graduate and professional schools.  In 
fact, the Grutter majority stated that percentage plans such as the Top 
Ten Percent Plan are not adequate substitutes for race-conscious ho-
listic admissions policies, which consider race and other diversity fac-
tors in a nuanced, individualized fashion.71  Grutter thus suggests that 
courts cannot compel universities to adopt percentage plans, even if 
the universities can attain numerical diversity similar to race-
conscious holistic admissions. 
Fisher was a very limited case to begin with, and it was never a good 
venue for the Court to make a broad pronouncement on race-
consciousness.  Rather, it is and always has been a “fishing expedi-
tion.”72 
B.  Holistic Admissions and the Bermuda Triangle:  The Numbers Still Don’t 
Add Up 
Looking beyond Fisher, if a university employs a holistic admissions 
process with individualized review, then in most cases, it cannot 
achieve both diversity and race-neutrality—regardless of how we de-
fine those tenets.  As noted earlier, if the diversity interest incorpo-
 
 69 But see supra note 68 (discussing different perspectives on whether the Top Ten Percent 
Plan is actually “race-neutral.”). 
 70 See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.803(a-1) (West 2010). 
 71 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340 (noting that percentage plans “may preclude the university from 
conducting the individualized assessments necessary to assemble a student body that is 
not just racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by the university”).  The 
Grutter majority also questioned how percentage plans could work for admission to 
graduate and professional schools.  Id. (noting the failure to explain how “‘percentage 
plans,’ recently adopted by public undergraduate institutions in Texas, Florida, and 
California, to guarantee admission to all students above a certain class-rank threshold in 
every high school in the State . . . could work for graduate and professional schools”). 
 72 See Harpalani, Fishing Expedition, supra note 36. 
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rates admission of individuals who specifically defy racial stereotypes, 
then there is no race-neutral admissions process that can attain it.73  
And if race-neutrality is defined in formal terms—as the absence of 
information about race in the admissions process—then it cannot be 
attained in a holistic admissions process with individualized review.74  
But what if we measure diversity solely by numerical representation, 
and what if we define race-neutrality in statistical terms—as the ab-
sence of disparities in academic criteria between minority and non-
minority admitted students? 
In theory, it may be possible to have a holistic admissions plan, at-
tain the desired numerical representation of minority groups, and 
have no statistical disparities in academic criteria between racial 
groups.  In practice, however, it is not currently possible most of the 
time.75  The underlying reason that universities need to use race-
conscious admissions policies is not to attain diversity per se, but be-
cause the magnitude of academic disparities between minority and 
non-minority applicants would not allow them to attain this diversity 
 
 73 See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 74 See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text. 
 75 See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, CENTURY FOUND., A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:  STATE 
UNIVERSITIES THAT CREATED ALTERNATIVES TO RACIAL PREFERENCES 26–61, available at 
http://tcf.org/assets/downloads/tcf-abaa.pdf (discussing the impact of state university 
bans on race-conscious admissions policies on minority student enrollment).  Mr. 
Kahlenberg finds that through a combination of recruitment and use of socioeconomic 
criteria and proxies for race as admissions factors, universities in Washington, Florida, 
Georgia, and Nebraska have been able to recover to prior levels of Black and Latina/o 
enrollment after experiencing initial drops in minority enrollment after bans on race-
conscious admissions.  Id. at 42, 46, 50 & 57.  However, it is unclear how much this 
recovery is due to demographic changes in the states (particularly the growing Latina/o 
populations), rather than the efficacy of race-neutral alternatives.  Additionally, state 
universities in Washington and Nebraska had low numbers of Black and Latina/o 
students even before enacting their bans (owing to the low percentage of minorities in 
the state population overall), and recovery using recruitment and race-neutral factors in 
those states did not require much.  Id. at 42 & 47.  These universities may never have 
approached a “critical mass” of minority students to begin with.  Even Justice Scalia 
agreed that regardless of a state’s demographics, very low percentages of minority 
students on campus does not constitute a critical mass.  At the oral argument in Fisher v. 
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), Justice Scalia asked “Why don’t you 
seriously suggest that demographic—that the demographic makeup of the state has 
nothing to do with whether somebody feels isolated, that if you’re in a state that is only 1 
percent black that doesn’t mean that you’re not  isolated, so long as there’s 1 percent in 
the class? . . .  I wish you would take that position because it seems, to me, right.”  See 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 41, at 15. 
   Moreover, in 15 years, the flagship public universities in California (UC Berkeley and 
UCLA) have not recovered to the levels of minority enrollment that they had before 
California’s ban on race-conscious admissions, in spite of a significant increase in the 
minority population of California.  See KAHLENBERG, supra, at 36, 38. 
844 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:3 
 
absent consideration of race.76  For the most part, the Fisher litigation 
ignored the most significant reason that most universities use race-
conscious admissions policies—because of disparities in academic 
admissions criteria between minority and non-minority applicants.77  
In her Grutter majority opinion, Justice O’Connor acknowledged this 
reality: 
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to 
further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public 
higher education.  Since that time, the number of minority applicants with 
high grades and test scores has indeed increased.  We expect that 25 years from 
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the inter-
est approved today.78 
 
 76 THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE & ALEXANDRIA WALTON RADFORD, NO LONGER SEPARATE, NOT 
YET EQUAL:  RACE AND CLASS IN ELITE COLLEGE ADMISSION AND CAMPUS LIFE 10, 92–93 
(2009) (reporting that in sample of 9,100 student respondents from eight highly-selective 
public and private institutions of higher education, compared to White admittees, race-
related admissions plus factors were equivalent to 310 points (out of 1,600 total) for Black 
admittees and 130 points for Hispanic admittees, while Asian admittees outscored Whites 
by 140 points).  For projected effects of eliminating race-conscious admissions on 
minority enrollments, see id. at 464–65 (private institutions), and id. at 480–81 (public 
institutions).  Both private and public institutions would see significant declines in Black 
and Hispanic enrollment with the elimination of race-conscious admissions policies. 
 77 Justice Clarence Thomas did make mention of academic disparities in his concurrence.  
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2431 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Blacks and Hispanics admitted to the 
University [of Texas at Austin] . . . are, on average, far less prepared than their white and 
Asian classmates. . . .[T]he University . . . has [not] presented a shred of evidence that 
black and Hispanic students are able to close this substantial gap during their time at the 
University.”). 
 78 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (emphasis added) (internal citation omit-
ted).  Ironically, in 2003, Justice O’Connor was all too willing to suggest a time limit for 
race-conscious admissions policies, one-half century after the Supreme Court refused to 
do so with school desegregation.  See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) 
(ordering racial integration of segregated public schools “with all deliberate speed”).  But 
see infra note 85–86 and accompanying text. 
   Nevertheless, Justice O’Connor herself later suggested that twenty-five years was not a 
binding time limit on race-conscious admissions.  See Sandra Day O’Connor & Stewart J. 
Schwab, Affirmative Action in Higher Education over the Next Twenty-Five Years:  A Need for 
Study and Action, in THE NEXT TWENTY-FIVE YEARS:  AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA 58, 62 (David L. Featherman, 
Martin Hall & Marvin Krislov eds., 2010) (“That 25-year expectation is, of course, far from 
binding on any justices who may be responsible for entertaining a challenge to an 
affirmative-action program in 2028.”).  Both parties in Fisher also agreed that the twenty-
five year limit was not binding.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 41, at 11 
(citing the plaintiff’s counsel, Bert Rein, as answering “No, I don’t” to Justice Scalia’s 
question, “do you think that Grutter held that there is no more affirmative action in 
higher education after 2028?”); id. at 50 (citing  counsel for UT, Gregory Garre, as noting 
that “we don’t read Grutter as establishing that kind of time clock”).  However, at the Fisher 
oral argument, Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer at least hinted that the twenty-
five year period was legally significant.  Id. at 50 (citing Justice Scalia as stating that Grutter 
“holds for . . . only . . . [s]ixteen more years”); id. at 8 (citing Justice Breyer as noting that 
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Justice O’Connor’s statement implies that the need for race-
conscious admissions policies is contingent upon racial disparities in 
academic criteria.  Moreover, in spite of their vast ideological differ-
ences, both Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Clarence Thom-
as acknowledged that racial disparities in academic criteria are the 
underlying reason why universities need to use race-conscious admis-
sions policies to attain diversity, and they both questioned Justice 
O’Connor’s aspiration here that racial disparities in academic criteria 
could be eliminated by 2028.79 
As such, even if we accepted a purely numerical definition of the 
diversity interest, it is not possible in most cases to attain appreciable 
numbers of minority students, unless universities use race as a flexible 
“plus factor” to compensate for academic disparities between groups.  
The “logical end point”80 of race-conscious admissions will occur 
when such disparities no longer exist.  At that time, it will be possible 
for universities to simultaneously use a holistic admissions process 
with individualized review, attain sufficient numerical diversity, and 
achieve statistical race-neutrality on academic criteria among admit-
ted applicants of all racial groups.  But that time is still far off.81 
C.  Summing Up the Bermuda Triangle:  Two Out of Three Ain’t Good 
Enough 
For the foreseeable future, diversity, race-neutrality, and individu-
alized review will form a Bermuda Triangle for university admissions.  
 
“Grutter said it would be good law for at least 25 years”).  Later in the oral arguments, 
Justice Breyer stated that he “agree[d] it might” be the holding of Grutter that there can 
be no race-conscious admissions policies after 2028.  Id. at 12. 
 79 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[I]t remains the current 
reality that many minority students encounter markedly inadequate and unequal 
educational opportunities.  Despite these inequalities, some minority students are able to 
meet the high threshold requirements set for admission to the country’s finest 
undergraduate and graduate educational institutions.  As lower school education in 
minority communities improves, an increase in the number of such students may be 
anticipated.  From today’s vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over 
the next generation’s span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal 
opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action.”); Id. at 375–76 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“The majority does not and cannot rest its time limitation on any evidence 
that the gap in credentials between black and white students is shrinking or will be gone 
in that timeframe. . . . No one can seriously contend, and the Court does not, that the 
racial gap in academic credentials will disappear in 25 years.”).  As noted, Justice 
O’Connor herself later backtracked from the twenty-five year timing for an end to race-
conscious admissions.  See supra note 78. 
 80 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (“[R]ace-conscious admissions policies must be limited in 
time. . . .[A]ll governmental use of race must have a logical end point.”). 
 81 See supra note 79. 
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Universities might be able to attain diversity (in terms of numerical 
representation) and formal race-neutrality, but not through a holistic 
admissions plan with individualized review.  They could use individu-
alized review and have a statistically race-neutral admissions policy, 
but that would compromise diversity (in terms of educational benefits 
and numerical representation).  And they can and do attain diversity 
(in terms of educational benefits and numerical representation) and 
have individualized review, but the holistic admissions plans they use 
to do so—currently the norm at elite universities—are not race-
neutral. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION:  STILL SERVING TWO MASTERS 
The double-consciousness of race-consciousness and the Bermuda 
Triangle of university admissions leave much uncertainty about the 
future of race-conscious admissions policies.  The Supreme Court has 
taken W.E.B. Du Bois’s proverbial “problem of the color line”82 and 
tied it into a complex, doctrinal Gordian knot.83  About the only 
things we can be sure of are that:  (1) race-conscious policies will con-
tinue to generate much controversy and debate—albeit mainly in 
lower courts and state governments rather than at the U.S. Supreme 
Court; and (2) advocates of race-consciousness will continue to face 
their own double-consciousness, reconciling the fight for racial equity 
in higher education and the confusing and convoluted doctrine that 
we must navigate to get there. 
A.  “With All Deliberate Speed”:  The Future of Race-Conscious Admissions 
While a majority of Justices on the Supreme Court would like to 
see an end to race-conscious admissions policies, we still have them.  
Fisher suggests that the Justices are not willing to end race-conscious 
policies in one fell swoop, and Schuette indicates they are content with 
state-level politics resolving the issue.84  In an ironic twist—déjà vu 
right amidst Brown’s diamond anniversary85—the Supreme Court 
seems content to let race-conscious admissions slip away gradually:  
“with all deliberate speed.”86 
How might this happen?  It will probably involve both law and pol-
itics.  While the Supreme Court punted in Fisher, the case still has a 
legal impact:  it allows lower courts do the dirty work.  District and 
 
 82 See DU BOIS, supra note 7. 
 83 The “Gordian knot” metaphor is associated with Alexander the Great and refers to an 
intractable problem that requires an unorthodox solution.  See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
KING HENRY THE FIFTH, ACT 1, sc. 1. (“Turn him to any cause of policy, The Gordian Knot 
of it he will unloose, Familiar as his garter . . . .”); see also Harpalani, supra note 2, at 83 
(noting how American race relations in the twenty-first century have “tied the proverbial 
‘color line’ into a Gordian Knot.”).  
 84 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 85 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racially segregated schools 
were unconstitutional).  The first Brown decision occurred on May 17, 1954.  Id.  The 
Supreme Court then addressed the appropriate remedy for racially segregated schools in 
1955. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)(ordering racial integration of 
segregated public schools “with all deliberate speed.”).  This second Brown decision 
occurred on May 31, 1955.  Id.  Thus, it is now right between Brown I and Brown II’s 
diamond anniversaries. 
 86 Brown, 349 U.S. at 301.  The Court’s vague and tenuous language, embodied by the 
phrase,“with all deliberate speed,” allowed Southern states to resist desegregation for 
many years—another twist of irony. 
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circuit courts can interpret ambiguities in definitions of diversity and 
race-neutrality to either uphold or to strike down specific race-
conscious admissions programs.  In particular, Fisher’s call for strin-
gent review, with “no deference” to universities on the implementa-
tion of race-conscious policies,87 may invite district court judges to 
strike down these policies—especially where the link between race-
consciousness and the educational benefits of diversity is not clearly 
articulated or demonstrated.  Lower courts may well differ in their 
application of the law, based on specific attributes of admissions poli-
cies and on political leanings of judges. 
The result is likely to be a very fractured jurisprudence.  Lower 
courts may come to various conclusions about the meaning and 
measurement of the diversity interest, about how much can be in-
ferred from numerical representation, about whether universities 
bear the burden to show educational benefits of diversity in addition 
to numerical representation, and about how universities must link 
the two.88  Courts might also view race-neutrality in different ways, 
and they may have different standards for evaluating the efficacy of 
race-neutral alternatives in producing diversity.  Eventually, another 
case will make it back to the Supreme Court.  We cannot predict the 
timing of said case:  twenty-five years elapsed between Bakke (1978) 
and Gratz and Grutter (2003), and then another ten years elapsed be-
fore Fisher (2013).  We also cannot predict the result, which will de-
pend, more than anything else, on the composition of the Court at 
the given time. 
But it might not even come to that, if the political aspect predom-
inates.  With its 2014 ruling in Schuette, the Court upheld the ability of 
states to pass constitutional bans on race-conscious policies.  Califor-
nia, Washington, Michigan, Nebraska, Arizona, and Oklahoma have 
already passed such state constitutional bans.89  Additionally, race-
 
 87 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2414 (2013) (“[A] University must 
prove that the [race-conscious] means it chose to attain . . . diversity are narrowly tailored 
to its goal.  On this point, the University receives no deference.”). 
 88 This debate has already started with Judge Emilio Garza’s dissent in Fisher on remand.  See 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 672 (5th Cir. 2014) (Garza, J., dissenting) 
(“[A]ssuming that the University’s diversity goal is establishing classroom diversity, it is 
the University that bears the burden of proving that the use of race . . . is necessary to 
furthering this goal.”).  Judge Garza critiqued the Fisher remand majority opinion for 
“continu[ing] to defer impermissibly to the University’s claims . . . deference [which] is 
squarely at odds with the central lesson of [the Supreme Court’s ruling in] Fisher.”  Id. at 
662 (Garza, J., dissenting). 
 89 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:  STATE ACTION 
(2014), available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/affirmative-action-state-
action.aspx. 
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conscious policies have been banned via executive action in Florida,90 
and via state legislative action in New Hampshire.91  Political process 
at the state level may continue to eliminate race-conscious admissions 
policies in many states92 before the Supreme Court takes up the con-
stitutionality of such policies again.  By then, if most states have al-
ready banned race-conscious policies, a Supreme Court ruling on 
eliminating race-conscious admissions might be a mere rubber stamp, 
reeling in any outlier jurisdictions that still allow them. 
Law and politics could also fold back on each other.  In jurisdic-
tions with state constitutional bans on race-conscious policies, such as 
California and Michigan, there could be legal challenges contending 
that universities still use race surreptitiously.93  As noted earlier, there 
have been such accusations in California, and Justices Souter and 
Ginsburg have warned us about this phenomenon.94  If such legal 
challenges come to bear, they would be different from Bakke, Gratz, 
 
 90 Fla. Exec. Order No. 99-281 (Nov. 9, 1999). 
 91 H.B. 623, 2011 Leg. (N.H. 2011) (codified as amended in N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 187 & 
188). 
 92 It is also possible that voters in some states will reject referenda to eliminate affirmative 
action, as occurred in Colorado in 2008.  See Colleen Slevin, Colorado Voters Reject 
Affirmative Action Ban, USA Today, Nov. 7, 2008, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/
politics/2008-11-07-1129194800_x.htm (“By 51 percent to 49 percent, Coloradans 
rejected a proposed constitutional ban on considering race or gender in state hiring, 
contracting and college admissions.”).  Additionally, a recent poll in California indicated 
that a majority of residents of each racial group supported “affirmative action programs 
designed to help blacks, women, and other minorities get better jobs and education[.]” 
See Karthick Ramakrishnan & Taeku Lee, Views of a Diverse Electorate:  Opinions of California 
Registered Voters in 2014, NAT’L ASIAN AM. SURV. 8 (Aug. 2014), available at http://www.
naasurvey.com/resources/Home/NAAS-Field-2014-final.pdf. 
 93 See supra note 63. 
 94 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 304–05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“One can 
reasonably anticipate . . . that colleges and universities will seek to maintain their minority 
enrollment . . . whether or not they can do so in full candor through adoption of 
affirmative action plans . . . . Without recourse to such plans, institutions of higher 
education may resort to camouflage.  For example, schools may encourage applicants to 
write of their cultural traditions in the essays they submit, or to indicate whether English 
is their second language.  Seeking to improve their chances for admission, applicants may 
highlight the minority group associations to which they belong, or the Hispanic surnames 
of their mothers or grandparents.  In turn, teachers’ recommendations may emphasize 
who a student is as much as what he or she has accomplished. . . . If honesty is the best 
policy, surely Michigan’s accurately described, fully disclosed College affirmative action 
program is preferable to achieving similar numbers through winks, nods, and 
disguises.”).  Justice Ginsburg reiterated this concern in her Fisher dissent.  See Fisher v. 
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“As for 
holistic review, if universities cannot explicitly include race as a factor, many may ‘resort 
to camouflage’ to ‘maintain their minority enrollment.’” (quoting Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting))); see also Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Equal 
protection cannot become an exercise in which the winners are the ones who hide the 
ball.”). 
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Grutter, and Fisher.  The universities involved would deny any inten-
tional use of race in admissions; to do otherwise would be an admis-
sion of unlawful activity.  Plaintiffs in such cases would have the high-
er burden of proving intent,95 which would create quite a quandary.96 
In short, the double-consciousness of race-consciousness and the 
Bermuda Triangle of university admissions pervade the Supreme 
Court’s rulings and render them a convoluted mess, open to highly 
varying interpretations.  Lower courts will have to deal with this mess 
until the Supreme Court gives further guidance, and it is likely that 
political actors—be they district court judges with strong feelings 
about the issue or state politicians seeking affirmative action bans—
will decide the foreseeable future of race-conscious admissions poli-
cies. 
B.  Double-Consciousness or Doublethink?:  Victory is Defeat 
Finally, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions and 
the Bermuda Triangle of university admissions, it is important to 
highlight the continuing double-consciousness of advocates of race-
consciousness.  Like the late Professor Derrick Bell, many such advo-
cates are not huge fans of the diversity interest.97  Although we may 
value diversity, we would prefer more social justice-oriented ration-
ales for race-conscious admissions, such as remediation for the effects 
of racial discrimination.98  We also fear that many of the risks that 
 
 95 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (noting that the Supreme Court has 
“not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of 
government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may 
affect a greater proportion of one race than of another”); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause protects against 
discrimination that occurs “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon 
an identifiable group”).  Alternatively, a federal constitutional claim might rest on “a 
clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race,” even if proof of intent is 
lacking.  Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).  
The question would then become:  what constitutes a “clear pattern”? 
 96 Of course, where there are state constitutional bans on race-conscious admissions 
policies, state courts could apply a different standard to allow disparate impact to serve as 
a basis for claims under those constitutional bans. 
 97 See supra notes 3–6. 
 98 See Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, Affirmative Action After Grutter:  Reflections on a Tortured 
Death, Imagining a Humanity-Affirming Reincarnation, 63 LA. L. REV. 705, 706 (2003) 
(contending “that the standard ‘diversity’ rationale for affirmative action . . . is not a 
remedial or corrective justice-based rationale, and hence, fails to address the central 
concerns of traditionally disadvantaged groups.”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Argot of 
Equality:  On the Importance of Disentangling “Diversity” and “Remediation” as Justifications for 
Race-Conscious Government Action, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 907, 913–14 (2010) (“The problem 
with the diversity rationale . . . is that it has come to serve as a de facto proxy for remedial 
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Professor Bell warned of a decade ago have come to bear:  diversity 
distracts attention from important issues of race and class justice, 
from efforts to reform universities’ reliance on admissions criteria 
such as grades and test scores, and from elite universities’ tendency to 
admit the most privileged members of minority groups.99  In Profes-
sor Bell’s words, affirmative action advocates feel like we are still 
“serving two masters”—freedom for elite universities and social justice 
for poor people of color100—and trying to make sense of a confusing 
and convoluted doctrine to do so. 
Despite his warnings, Professor Bell acknowledged that confront-
ing the real issues would “not be easy and [would] be resisted fierce-
ly.”101  Indeed, they constitute a direct confrontation not only with 
mismatch theorists and other affirmative action opponents, but also 
with university administrators.102  The diversity rationale—now thrice 
reinforced by the Supreme Court103 and tied to individualized review 
and holistic admissions—appears much safer.  But Professor Bell still 
preferred those tougher battles to diversity’s distractions104 because 
those battles confronted the real issues that can lead towards racial 
 
concerns.”); Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action:  Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1, 34 (2002) (“[M]any of affirmative action’s more forthright defenders 
readily concede that diversity is merely the current rationale of convenience for a policy 
that they prefer to justify on other grounds.”).  The Supreme Court has rejected “the 
remedying of the effects of ‘societal discrimination’” as a compelling interest, stating that 
societal discrimination constitutes “an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless 
in its reach into the past.”  City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496–98 
(1989) (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)). 
 99 See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. 
100 See supra text accompanying notes 8–12; See also Bell, supra note 3, at 1632 (“Diversity. . . is 
less a means of continuing minority admissions programs in the face of widespread oppo-
sition than it is a shield behind which college administrators can retain policies of admis-
sion that are. . . convenient vehicles for admitting the children of wealth and privilege.  
Justice O’Connor is comfortable with having elites handle admissions and then legitimate 
their choices with a critical mass of people of color.”). 
101 Bell, supra note 3, at 1633. 
102 See id. (“[T]he long-overdue reform of admissions standards . . . will be resisted fiercely by 
many if not most of those colleges and graduate schools with whom civil rights advocates 
joined in the effort to save minority admissions through the distraction we are calling 
diversity.”). 
103 See supra notes 1, 19 & 25. 
104 See Bell, supra note 3, at 1633 (“It may be that challenges by civil rights and community 
groups calling attention to the inaccuracies and unfairness of standardized tests will lead 
to their revision or even abandonment.  If that effort is successful, it will not be the first 
time that civil rights campaigns initiated to remedy racial barriers resulted in reforms that 
worked to the benefit of all. . . . Predictably, though, the long-overdue reform of admis-
sions standards will not be easy and will be resisted fiercely by many if not most of those 
colleges and graduate schools with whom civil rights advocates joined in the effort to save 
minority admissions through the distraction we are calling diversity.”).  
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equality.  From a strategic perspective, it is debatable whether Profes-
sor Bell was correct, but regardless, he was well-known for challeng-
ing the civil rights orthodoxy105 and for confronting authority more 
generally.106  By expressing his own double-consciousness, he gave 
voice to the profound ambivalence felt by many advocates of racial 
justice in the years after the civil rights movement.  Nevertheless, in 
W.E.B. Du Bois’s words, Professor Bell was truly “gifted with a second-
sight,”107 and his insights influenced several generations of legal 
scholars and social activists,108 including me.109   
When the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Fisher in June 2013, 
my immediate reaction was that it was “the best realistic outcome for 
proponents of affirmative action (I consider myself to be a strong 
one)” and that “proponents of affirmative action should declare vic-
tory for now,”110 in spite of the fact that the Court had ruled against 
UT by vacating its lower court victory.111  And one year later, when 
Schuette upheld Michigan’s state constitutional ban on race-conscious 
admissions,112 right on Grutter’s original victory ground, my commen-
tary on HuffPost Live similarly spun a defeat positively.113  I focused 
on the fact that Colorado voters had rejected a state referendum to 
 
105 See Bell, supra note 3, at 1633 (arguing that reforms “initiated to remedy racial barriers” 
often “provide more advances for whites than for blacks”). 
106 See DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY:  REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTER xi 
(1994) (encouraging readers to confront the wrongs that “afflict their lives and the lives 
of others”). 
107 DU BOIS, supra note 7, at 3 (“After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the 
Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with 
second-sight in this American world,—a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, 
but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world.” (emphasis 
added)). 
108 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Toolkit—Fit to Dismantle that Famous House?, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 284 (2000) (“Derrick Bell . . . conducted me to intellectual realms 
hitherto unknown and unimagined, opening up vistas I never knew existed.  And . . . he 
never charged me a nickel, and left me secure, as a reader and now a friend, that I was 
always in good hands.”). 
109 See Harpalani, supra note 13, at xxiii, xxviii  (describing Professor Derrick Bell’s teaching 
and life philosophies and his impact on students); Vinay Harpalani, Tributes in Memory of 
Professor Derrick Bell, DERRICK BELL OFFICIAL SITE (Oct. 16, 2011), 
http://professorderrickbell.com/tributes/vinay-harpalani/ (same). 
110 Vinay Harpalani, Affirmative Action Survives—For Now, IIT CHICAGO-KENT FACULTY BLOG 
(June 24, 2013), http://blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/2013/06/24/affirmative-action-
survives-for-now. 
111 See supra note 16. 
112 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
113 Affirmative Action:  SCOTUS Upholds Michigan Ban (Huffpost Live broadcast Apr. 22, 2014), 
available at http://live.huffingtonpost.com/r/segment/affirmative-action-scotus-uhpolds-
michigan-ban/5353ba20fe34449b6f00024e (featuring Vinay Harpalani in a discussion of 
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action). 
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ban race-conscious policies not too long ago,114 demonstrating that 
social activism could convince voters to reject these bans.115  My forth-
coming piece in the Seton Hall Law Review also charges forward:  it ar-
gues that the Court’s broad definition of the diversity interest allows 
universities to defend race-conscious admissions policies, and it pro-
poses novel strategies for universities to do so.116 
Most recently, UT prevailed in Fisher on remand.117  I could con-
clude this Article by once again claiming a victory for affirmative ac-
tion, as I did after Grutter,118 and on several occasions since.119  But 
double-consciousness is indeed a “peculiar sensation”120—it is fraught 
with Orwellian irony and often feels more like doublethink:  “holding 
two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting 
both of them.”121  The Fisher remand appeal to the Supreme Court 
still looms,122 and recently an anti-affirmative action organization 
(ironically named “Students for Fair Admissions”)123 filed two new 
 
114 See Slevin, supra note 92. 
115 See id. (noting that opponents of Colorado’s proposed ban on affirmative action 
“launched a door-to-door campaign . . . [and] ran radio ads in English and Spanish 
against the amendment”). 
116 Vinay Harpalani, Narrowly Tailored but Broadly Compelling:  Defending Race-Conscious 
Admissions After Fisher, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (“This Article argues 
that Fisher v. Texas does not spell doom for race-conscious admissions policies, in spite of 
its call for universities to seriously examine whether race-neutral alternatives can attain 
the educational benefits of diversity.”). 
117 See supra note 16. 
118 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
119 See supra notes 110–16 and accompanying text. 
120 DU BOIS, supra note 7 (“It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness . . . .”). 
121 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 224 (Knopf Doubleday Publ’g Grp. 2009) (defining 
“doublethink” as “the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind 
simultaneously, and accepting both of them”).  1984’s dystopian world also gives the 
ironic Party slogans of “War is Peace,” “Freedom is Slavery,” and “Ignorance is Strength”).  
Id. at 6.  1984 is in many ways similar to Professor Derrick Bell’s own dystopian narratives 
in AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:  THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) and FACES AT 
THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL:  THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992). 
122 See supra note 16. 
123 Organizations that focus on eliminating race-conscious university admissions often 
choose such ironic names, such as “Center for Equal Opportunity” and “the Project on 
Fair Representation.”  See Center for Equal Opportunity:  The Nation’s Only Conservative Think 
Tank Devoted to Issues of Race and Ethnicity, CENTER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, 
http://www.ceousa.org; Welcome to the Project on Fair Representation!, PROJECT ON FAIR 
REPRESENTATION, http://www.projectonfairrepresentation.org.  Anti-affirmative action 
ballot initiatives are also given ironic names; California’s Proposition 209 is called the 
California Civil Rights Initiative, Washington’s Initiative 200 is called the Washington 
Civil Rights Initiative, and Michigan’s Proposal 2 is called the Michigan Civil Rights 
Initiative.  See Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative:  An Interpretive Guide, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1397 (1997) (“Proposition 209 is called the California Civil Rights 
Initiative because it restates the historic Civil Rights Act and proclaims simply and clearly:  
‘The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any 
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lawsuits, challenging race-conscious admissions policies at Harvard 
University and at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.124  I 
can only conclude with Professor Bell’s prophetic admonition that 
“civil rights victory” would indeed be “hard to distinguish from de-
feat.”125 
 
individual or group, on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin in the 
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.’”); Paul Guppy, 
Policy Brief—A Citizen’s Guide to Initiative 200:  The Washington State Civil Rights Initiative, 
WASH. POL’Y CENTER (Sept. 1998),  http://www.washingtonpolicy.org/publications/
brief/citizens-guide-initiative-200-washington-state-civil-rights-initiative (referring to 
Washington’s Initative 200 as “the Washington Civil Rights Initiative);  The Michigan Civil 
Rights Initiative:  News and Commentary, ADVERSITY.NET (Nov. 7, 2006),  http://www.
adversity.net/michigan/mcri_mainframe.htm (referring to Michigan’s Proposal 2 as “the 
Michigan Civil Rights Initative”).  All of these names are again reminiscent of George 
Orwell’s 1984, supra note 121, in which the Ministry of Peace focused on perpetuating 
warfare, the Ministry of Truth focused on propaganda and distortion of history, and the 
Ministry of Love focused on torturing dissidents and forcing them to comply with Big 
Brother’s directives.  See id. at 6. 
124 Nick Anderson, Lawsuits Allege Unlawful Racial Bias in Admissions at Harvard, UNC-Chapel 
Hill, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/
lawsuits-allege-unlawful-racial-bias-in-admissions-at-harvard-unc-chapel-hill/2014/11/17/
b117b966-6e9a-11e4-ad12-3734c461eab6_story.html (discussing the two pending lawsuits 
alleging unlawful bias in admission policies at Harvard University and the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill brought by a group plaintiff called “Students for Fair 
Admissions”); Lyle Denniston, Direct New Challenges to Bakke Ruling (FURTHER 
UPDATE), SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 17, 2014, 10:17 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/
11/direct-new-challenges-to-bakke-ruling/ (describing the lawsuits against Harvard 
University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and characterizing them as 
sequels to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin). 
125 Bell, supra note 3, at 1622. 
